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DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE ON DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE: THE COURTS' CONFLICTING STANDARDS FOR THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW IMMIGRATION LAWS TO PAST ACTS
Anjum Gupta* A decade ago, the United States Supreme Court held that a newly enacted law that attaches adverse immigration consequences to certain criminal convictions could not be retroactively applied in the case of an immigrant who was convicted of the offense pursuant to a guilty plea before enactment of the new law. Since then, the courts of appeals that have addressed the same issue in the context of an immigrant who was convicted at trial, rather than after a guilty plea, have done so with remarkable divergence. Some courts have held that, unlike immigrants who pled guilty, immigrants who went to trial cannot show that they detrimentally relied on the old law; accordingly, the new law may be applied retroactively. Other courts have rejected the detrimental reliance requirement. In this article, I argue that detrimental reliance, while properly viewed as a factor in retroactivity analysis, must not be viewed as a requirement for challenging the retroactive application of a new law to past acts. of new laws to past acts in both the criminal and civil contexts is clear. In the criminal context, retroactive application of new penal laws to past crimes, regardless of congressional intent, is flatly prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 1 In the civil context, the Supreme Court has announced a two-step test used in determining whether retroactive application of a newly enacted law to a past act is impermissible. First, courts must "determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach." 2 If Congress has expressly stated that the statute shall apply retroactively, then it may permissibly be so applied. 3 Second, absent such express language, "court[s] must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." 4 If so, the statute may not be applied retroactively. 5 Thus, in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the case in which the Supreme Court first announced this two-step test, the Court held that Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which created a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII, could not be applied retroactively to sexual harassment that occurred prior to the enactment of the law. 6 The Court reasoned that "the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence," and that "[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted." 7 The case law with respect to retroactive application of new laws to past acts in the immigration context, however, has not been so clear. Enacted in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") repealed a decades-old discretionary form of relief from removal, commonly referred to as § 212(c) relief, for legal permanent residents ("LPRs") convicted of certain removable crimes. 8 The question then arose whether a lawful Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, on the other hand, require a showing of objectively reasonable reliance; that is to say, a showing that the immigrant merely is a member of a class of immigrants who likely relied on the availability of relief in pleading guilty. 13 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently agreed, stating that a showing of detrimental reliance on the old law is necessary to successfully argue against retroactive application of the new provision, but it declined to address whether the reliance shown must be actual or objectively reasonable. 14 Significantly, while these courts have interpreted the St. Cyr decision as requiring a showing of reliance, they have not held that pleading guilty to a crime in reliance on the existing state of the law is the exclusive way to show reliance. Some courts, for example, have held that an immigrant who waited to file his § 212(c) application "based on the considered and reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to file a stronger application for 212(c) relief at a later time" has shown the necessary reliance required to defeat retroactive application of a provision that stripped § 212(c) relief in the interim. 15 ) ("Petitioner's claim that he did not seek 212(c) relief when he could have, because of his expectation that it would be available later, readily fits within the Court's concept of reasonable reliance. But just as we today hold that a guilty plea is not the only kind of reliance that would make the abolition of 212(c) have an impermissible retroactive effect under Landgraf, so we wish to make clear that the kind of reliance involved in the instant case is itself not another exclusive category of Landgraf reliance that applies to aliens. It is just another example of reliance.") (emphasis in original); see also Carranza-De Salinas, 477 F.3d at 210 ("If . . . Carranza can demonstrate on remand that she affirmatively decided to postpone her § 212(c) application to increase her likelihood of relief, then she has . . . established a reasonable 'reliance interest' in the future availability of § 212(c) relief comparable to that of the applicants in St. Cyr and she is entitled to make her application for relief.").
conviction when a successful appeal could have deprived them of § 212(c) eligibility" had similarly shown the type of reliance required to defeat the retroactive repeal of eligibility for relief. 16 On the other side of the split, the Third and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that a showing of reliance is not a requirement to defeat retroactive application of a new law, but rather only one of many considerations in determining whether retroactive application attaches new legal consequences to past acts under Landgraf. 17 Accordingly, in those two circuits, § 212(c) remains available to immigrants who were convicted of removable crimes prior to the repeal, regardless of whether they went to trial or entered guilty pleas. To further add to the confusion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in one case, agreed with the Third Circuit that a showing of reliance is not required to defeat retroactive application of a new immigration law. 18 But it held in a subsequent case-and without citation to the prior decision-that immigrants who went to trial could not demonstrate the reliance required to successfully challenge retroactive application of the repeal. 19 Despite this glaring circuit split, the Supreme Court has declined to address the issue in no fewer than sixteen cases. 20 [W] e conclude that reliance is but one consideration in assessing whether a statute attaches new legal consequences to past events. In applying its commonsense, functional judgment as to whether a statute attaches new legal consequences, a court can certainly be guided by considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. Nowhere in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, however, has reliance (or any other guidepost) become the sine qua non of the retroactive effects inquiry.") (citation omitted); Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Having carefully reviewed these various decisions [from other circuits], we will follow the Third Circuit's decision in Atkinson. That court first noted that requiring actual reliance in each case 'runs contrary' to the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis in Landgraf, which was the basis for the decision in St. Cyr. Under Landgraf, a determination that a statute has an impermissible retroactive effect "is applied across the board.") (citations omitted).
18. See Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383, 388-89 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The government [maintains] that IIRIRA's retroactive application is permissible unless Olatunji can demonstrate that he 'almost certainly relied' upon his ability to take brief trips abroad when he entered his plea. And the government further suggests that it can defeat the presumption against retroactivity merely by notifying aggrieved parties of the adverse consequences of the statutes it seeks to enforce retroactively. Believing that these twin requirements would all but turn the presumption against retroactivity on its head, we hold that reliance (whether subjective or objective) is not a requirement of impermissible retroactivity and that the government's notice is insufficient to overcome the impermissibly retroactive effect of IIRIRA on Olatunji's guilty plea.") (citations omitted 22 Just as in the civil context, as set forth in Landgraf, retroactive application of a new immigration provision that attaches adverse legal consequences to past acts that an immigrant is helpless to undo should be viewed as impermissible, regardless of whether the immigrant went to trial or entered a guilty plea, or whether he can otherwise show detrimental reliance on the old law. Several arguments support this contention.
First, the imposition of a reliance requirement, whether actual or objective, contravenes Supreme Court case law. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court determined that a new civil law providing for compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimination could not be applied retroactively to discrimination that had already 29. The Court rejected Judulang's retroactivity argument in a footnote, reasoning that the agency's prior practice was so unsettled that Judulang could not possibly show that his "settled expectations" were upset. Id. at 489 n.12. In contrast, the prior law in the § 212(c) cases described above and in the Vartelas case described below was clear.
30. Id. at 487.
on nor relates to an alien's fitness to remain in the country-is arbitrary and capricious." 31 The Judulang decision makes clear the Supreme Court's continuing commitment to ensure fairness in the administration of § 212(c) relief and its recognition that, though § 212(c) relief is discretionary, any limitations on immigrants' right to seek such relief must not be arbitrary. Whether an immigrant chose to plead guilty to a crime in reliance upon the availability of discretionary relief instead of going to trial similarly is unrelated to that immigrant's "fitness to remain in the country," and the imposition of the reliance requirement should accordingly also be struck down. 32 Second, the Courts of Appeals' imposition of a reliance requirement creates an anomaly with respect to the traditional placement of immigration cases along the civil/criminal continuum. Although the Supreme Court traditionally has held that immigration proceedings are civil in nature, 33 in light of the liberty interests involved in removal proceedings, the protections afforded to immigrants in some contexts fall somewhere between the protections afforded to civil litigants and those afforded to criminal defendants. For example, while civil litigants are generally not entitled to effective assistance of counsel as a constitutional matter, immigrants in removal proceedings may seek relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 34 Similarly, while the exclusionary rule of evidence is generally not applicable in civil proceedings, 35 37 Moreover, given the liberty interests implicated by detention or deportation, many scholars argue that at least some immigration proceedings should be treated as criminal rather than civil in nature, or at least somewhere between the criminal/civil divide. 38 Indeed, there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court itself is headed in this direction. 39 Far from treating the retroactivity rule in the immigration context as similar to the rule against ex post facto laws in the criminal context, imposing a reliance requirement in immigration cases places upon immigrants a burden not even faced by civil litigants when challenging the retroactive application of a new law.
Third, various policy reasons exist for rejecting the reliance requirement in immigration cases. For example, the reliance requirement forces immigration judges to delve into the facts of what occurred during an immigrant's criminal proceedings in order to determine eligibility for immigration relief, an inquiry that is arguably outside the scope of agency expertise. 40 Indeed, courts and scholars have recognized as much in advocating for the categorical approach to classifying crimes under the immigration statutes. 41 In addition, obvious administrative costs to such an inquiry could be avoided by prohibiting the retroactive application of new immigration laws without regard to reliance. 42 Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized in St. Cyr, many states require criminal trial judges to adequately advise immigrants of the immigration consequences of their criminal proceedings, and similar ethical rules exist for criminal defense counsel. 43 Recently, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defense attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform a client that a guilty plea carries a risk of removal. 44 Creating a distinction for retroactivity purposes between those who go to trial and those who plead guilty, even for the same offense, unnecessarily adds a layer of complexity to this already labyrinthine area of the law.
Fourth, there are potential constitutional concerns raised by the imposition of a reliance requirement in retroactivity cases. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[i]n some cases . . . the interest in avoiding the adjudication of constitutional questions will counsel against a retroactive application" 45 and stated that "[r]etroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise a serious constitutional question." 46 Given the harsh consequences associated with removal, particularly in the § 212(c) context where the immigrants at issue are LPRs, retroactive imposition of the repeal also raises serious constitutional questions. 47 Moreover, in the § 212(c) context (as in other immigration contexts), retroactive application might raise equal protection and right to trial by jury concerns. Courts should avoid such concerns by holding impermissible the retroactive application of new immigration provisions that impose adverse legal consequences to past acts that the immigrant is helpless to undo, regardless of the immigrant's ability to show detrimental reliance on the old law. Finally, even if reliance were properly required, the requirement arguably is being misapplied in the immigration context. In many cases, the operative event for retroactivity analysis will be the commission of the crime, since that is what attaches disabilities under the new provision. Yet, courts, borrowing reasoning from Seventh Circuit Judge Posner, have stated: "It would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have decided not to commit [their] crimes . . . had they known that . . . they could not ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation." 48 This reasoning is unconvincing. As one judge so eloquently put it:
[T]his oft-quoted passage is one that conflicts with my "'sound instincts'" as a judge. If it is, indeed, absurd to suggest that a person contemplating the commission of a crime considers the potential consequences of criminal conduct, then Congress and the Sentencing Commission surely are misguided in their attempts to deter crime through increased sentences. I respectfully suggest that it is far from absurd to believe the prospect of certain deportation, rather than possible deportation, might well deter a significant number of aliens from committing aggravated felonies. 49 Further, this reasoning does not comply with the Supreme Court's holding in Landgraf. If it would "border on the absurd" to argue that immigrants might have decided not to commit crimes had they known they would be unable to apply for § 212(c) relief, it would equally "border on the absurd" to argue that Landgraf's co-worker would not have sexually harassed her had he known that the employer might be subject to compensatory or punitive damages. Yet the Court in Landgraf took no such analysis; it simply held that retroactive application of the damages provision to a past act that the employer was helpless to undo would be impermissible because the employer's settled expectations would be upset by such application. 50 No further showing of individualized reliance, whether subjective or otherwise, was required. Moreover, even in cases where the conviction, and not the commission of the crime, is the operative event for retroactivity analysis, it could be argued that immigrants who chose to go to trial instead of pleading guilty relied on the possibility of obtaining § 212(c) relief upon conviction as a worst case scenario in weighing whether or not to risk going to trial. In other words, had they known § 212(c) would not be available to them upon conviction at trial, they may have decided to plead guilty instead to preserve their eligibility for § 212(c) relief. Thus, "familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations" counsel against retroactive application in such cases. 51 III. VARTELAS V. HOLDER: AN OPPORTUNITY As stated above, the Supreme Court thus far has refused to address the issue of whether or not a showing of detrimental reliance is required when an immigrant challenges the retroactive application of the repeal of § 212(c) relief to his case. However, the Court has recently granted certiorari in an immigration case outside the § 212(c) context that implicates the role of detrimental reliance in determining the retroactive application of new immigration sanctions. 52 Nowhere is the problematic nature of the courts of appeals' imposition of a reliance requirement in immigration cases more clear than in this case.
In Vartelas v. Holder, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the retroactive application of an IIRIRA provision which rendered an LPR who previously committed a crime involving moral turpitude inadmissible upon return from travel outside the United States. Panagis Vartelas, a citizen of Greece, has been in the United States since 1979 and has been an LPR since 1989. 53 He has a U.S. citizen wife and two U.S. citizen children. 54 In 1994, after he pled guilty, Vartelas was convicted of conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security, and he was sentenced to four months' imprisonment. 55 The crime of which he was convicted is considered a crime involving moral turpitude, 56 alien status" without fear of deportation. 60 However, effective April 1, 1997, IIRIRA and subsequent agency interpretation changed the immigration laws to provide that an LPR who had committed a crime involving moral turpitude and who departed and returned to the United States, regardless of the length of the trip or the LPR's intent in departing, is removable. 61 Accordingly, Vartelas was ordered removed. 62 In challenging his removal, Vartelas argued that the new rule was impermissible as retroactively applied to his case. 63 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. The court held that even though Vartelas had been convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, the new IIRIRA rule could permissibly be applied retroactively to Vartelas's pre-enactment conduct. The court reasoned that because the inadmissibility provision attaches upon commission of a crime, rather than conviction, Vartelas's decision to plead guilty was irrelevant. 64 Looking then at Vartelas's commission of the crime as the operative event, the court, once again relying on Judge Posner's absurdity argument, stated that "it would border on the absurd to suggest that Vartelas committed his counterfeiting crime in reliance on the immigration laws." 65 The court accordingly held that Vartelas could not show the type of individualized reliance required in that circuit. 66 Vartelas petitioned for review with the Supreme Court, and the Court recently granted certiorari. 67 In my view, the court's reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, as set forth above, the court improperly viewed a showing of detrimental reliance as a requirement for successfully challenging the retroactive application of the new rule to Vartelas's past crime. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf, the first step is to "determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach," 68 and as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals correctly determined, Congress made no such express statement. 69 Pursuant to Landgraf's second step, the new rule clearly "impair[s] rights [Vartelas] possessed when he acted," namely, the right to travel abroad without fear of removal upon return. 70 Thus, the new rule is impermissible as retroactively applied. 71 No showing of detrimental reliance is necessary. Second, even if the court properly required a showing of reliance on the state of the old law, the court was too quick to dismiss the considerations Vartelas undertook in deciding to commit the crime. It is at least possible that the prospect of losing the right to travel or being deemed inadmissible upon return would have deterred Vartelas from committing the crime he committed. 72 Indeed, under the court's reasoning, there is simply nothing Vartelas could have done to preserve the rights he possessed when he acted, an outcome that is clearly at odds with the historic "presumption against retroactivity." 73 Moreover, in determining that the commission of the crime-as opposed to the conviction of the crime-is the operative event for retroactivity analysis, the court assumes that the crime was actually committed. That is, the court ignores the widely recognized fact that there are many reasons why someone innocent of a crime might nevertheless choose to plead guilty to it, particularly if there is a risk of false conviction of a more serious crime with more drastic consequences upon trial by jury. 74 An immigrant defendant, for example, might decide to plead guilty to an offense which would offer the possibility of a discretionary waiver from removal, rather than risk being convicted at trial of an offense that makes one statutorily removable without the possibility of a waiver, even if he had not committed the crime in the first place. Yet, under the court's reasoning, even that level of reliance-a level much higher than that of the beneficiaries of the St. Cyr holding, many of whom undoubtedly actually committed the crimes to which they pled guilty-would not be sufficient to challenge the retroactive application of a new law that attaches a legal disability upon commission of a certain type of crime. The Supreme Court in St. Cyr could not have intended such an outcome. Thus, arguably, even if the statutory language points to the commission of a crime as the triggering event, and even if a showing of detrimental reliance were properly required, it might make sense to view a plea as evidence of detrimental reliance. In my view, however, the Supreme Court should hold that a showing of detrimental reliance is not required in any event; thus, it need not address this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Supreme Court should use Vartelas as an opportunity to hold that reliance, while permissibly viewed as sufficient in demonstrating that an immigrant's settled expectations would be upset by the retroactive application of a new immigration law to past acts, is not required. As was the case in Landgraf, the mere fact that retroactive application of the new provision would clearly "impair rights" Vartelas "possessed when he acted" 75 should be enough to prohibit such application. 75 . See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
